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Bringing to Remembrance:
The Trauma Memory Debate

Marleen S. Williams, Ph.D.1

Abstract
Recent focus on memories of abuse that are recalled during therapy has alerted mental health care providers to potential hazards
to the client, the therapist, and innocent others. Being aware of
current research on how memory works can help reduce these
risks. Integrating information from both sides of the debate provides a more accurate understanding of delayed memory recall.

ecently, the courts have awarded millions of dollars to plaintiffs
who have claimed that therapy im planted false memories of
childhood abuse, creating unwarranted distress and disruption of family relationships. For example, Beth Rutherford, of Missouri, remembered while in therapy that when she was between the ages of seven
and fourteen, her father repeatedly raped her while her mother held
her down. She also remembered under guidance from her therapist
that she had become pregnant twice and was forced to abort the pregnancy herself. When the client made the accusation, the father, a clergyman, was forced to resign from his job. Later medical examination
revealed that Beth Rutherford was still a virgin. The court awarded
one million dollars in damages to the plaintiff (Loftus, 1997).
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On the other hand, however, most therapists are aware of the high
frequency of documented sexual and physical abuse that exists. There
is abundant evidence that child sexual abuse is a complex, chronic,
and pervasive problem that has historically been inadequately
acknowledged. The collusion of secrecy, the power differential
between victim and abuser, and lack of support and validation for the
child victim all create intense emotional distress and problems in normal functioning and relationships for the child.
Recent focus on delayed memories of abuse has alerted clinicians
to potential hazards to therapists, clients, and their families if therapy
is not conducted with care as well as compassion. Being careful and
compassionate may not, however, be enough to prevent legal, ethical,
and clinical problems from arising. In response to the increasing number of legal and ethical complaints that have arisen in recent years,
professional organizations such as the American Psychological
Association have commissioned reports and issued directives on working with clients who may have histories of abuse.
When working with clients who remember abuse either before or
during therapy, it is critical to review research on how memory
works. Memory is not like a video recording where everything is an
exact replica and if it can only be keyed up to the right spot you can
get an accurate replay (Schacter, 1996). No one knows exactly how
memory does work. Constructing an exact model of how memory
functions is difficult because findings from research are very complex
and often contradictory (Parkin, 1987). Memory does seem to rely,
however, on a sequence of steps, each of which can impact accuracy
and interpretation of memory. Those steps include sensory input,
coding, storage, retrieval, reconstruction, and meaning (Brandi monte
etal.,1996).

Sensory Input
Unless a person receives input from one of the five senses, there is
no physiological mechanism for beginning the memory process. A
person must respond through sight, smell, hearing, taste, or touch in
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order to have awareness of an event. If a person is unconscious at the
time of an event and that event leaves no sensory evidence, the person
will have no memory for the event. If no sensory information gets to
the brain, it cannot be remembered. Sensory input is not always a perfectly accurate representation of external events, however. Deficits in
vision, hearing, tactile, taste, or olfactory processes may distort incoming information.

Encoding
Memory can be encoded in any sensory modality. For example,
most people can recognize and differentiate smells without ever seeing
the source. Memory can also be coded without language. Procedural
memory is memory for things we can do but mayor may not be able
to verbally explain (Parkin, 1987). A person may be able to remember
how to drive to a certain location by recognizing visual cues while on
the road but cannot later give verbal instructions on how to get there.
Some memory information may function independently of language
even though we could later attach a verbal description. For example,
you can remember how to walk and chew gum at the same time without verbally processing either activity, but could probably reconstruct
the process verbally later.
A significant amount of research suggests that some memories,
particularly traumatic ones, may only get coded in sensorimotor or
somato-sensory ways (Sapota and van del' Kolk, 1992; van der Kolk,
1984, 1987, 1988; van del' Kolk and Saporta, 1991; van del' Kolk and
van der Hart, 1991). Strong evidence also exists that pre-verbal children who experience traumatic events can behaviorally re-enact the
trauma even if they have no verbal recall (Rovee-Collier, 1993 Hewitt,
1994; Terr, 1988, 1989). Two brain structures that playa role in nonverbal memory, the amygdala and hippocampus, function differently
under stress (Christianson, 1992; Heuer and Rausberg, 1992; Janet,
1889; LeDoux, 1992, 1994; McGaugh, 1992; Cahill et al., 1994;
Nilsson and Archer, 1992). Evidence also exists that intense emotional arousal plays a role in developing two separate memory systems-
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one for cognltIve information and one for affective information
(Zajonc, 1980, 1981, 1984). These "amygdala" memories are sensory
and emotionally, but not verbally, cued.
These findings about memory and how the brain works provide
evidence for the validity of body memories as well as the split between
thought and feeling that is seen with some trauma survivors. Although
almost no biological research accounts for repression in a Freudian
sense, there is considerable evidence to suggest a mechanism that works
more like dissociation (Christianson and Nilsson, 1989; Greenberg,
Pearlman, Schwartz and Grossman, 1983; Janet 1925; Ohman, 1991).
Does this mean that all visual flashbacks, body memories, and
other nonverbal re-enactments are perfect portrayals of past events?
No, that assumes more than the evidence implies. Internal, as well as
external, sources of information are also coded and stored in the memory. Fantasy, dreams, plans, anticipation of events, hopes, and fears all
become part of the system and are coded and stored along with real
events. Early childhood events such as medical procedures or other
traumatic experiences may be coded and stored through visual or sensory modalities because the child has not yet acquired the language for
interpreting the event. In children, the frontal lobes, hippocampus,
and other brain structures important in understanding and storing
memory are not fully developed. Memory for events may be partial or
mis-coded, making reconstructing accurate memories difficult or
impossible without external information (Enns et al., 1995).
A case example illustrates this. A young woman presented a story
in therapy of flashback images and memories that she believed meant
she had experienced ritualistic abuse in childhood. The memories and
images were of men in black or black men cutting her, blood on her
underclothes, and being bound or restrained. She also believed that
her father had been involved in the abuse. She believed the abuse
occurred at a very young age. She could not remember more than
these memory fragments.
Her therapist encouraged her to speak with her older brother,
whom she trusted, about the memories. He disclosed to her that when
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she was three years old, she had become entangled in a pile of barbed
wire. The more she struggled, the more she became caught and
restrained. Two black farm hands heard her cry and came running
with wire cutters to free her. They had verbally teased her a little,
which had been very upsetting to her. When they had cut the wire,
freeing her, they carried her home to her father. The barbed wire had
cut her causing her to bleed onto her clothing (Stephenson, 1997).
Nonverbal memories may also be later "re-coded"in light of adult
meaning. Attributing long-standing psychological problems to events
that were only given meaning during therapy can be risky. For example, Roseanne Barr's attribution of life-long problems because her
mother fondled her in infancy doesn't make sense because early experiences of fondling would not be coded any differently than other
activities such as diapering, toileting, or applying ointment. The
meaning of "betrayal" was only given to the event later in life
(American Psychological Association, 1996).
Confounding variables such as family dysfunction, physical, verbal, and emotional abuse as well as biological vulnerability and other
life events may become intertwined and make it impossible to understand and accurately account for the client's distress. The therapist
cannot safely conclude that the severity of the client's symptoms
equals the severity of sexual abuse (Beitchman et aI., 1991, 1992;
Kihlstrom, 1994; Nash et aI., 1993).

Storage
After sensory input is received and coded, information must be
put into long-term storage in order to become a memory. Rehearsal is
one of the main mechanisms for storage (Parkin 1987). Events that
happen over and over are more likely to become permanent memories
than isolated or rare events. Highly emotionally arousing events can
be an exception, however. "Flashbulb" memories may be detailed and
long-lasting even though the event occurred only once (Conway,
1995). This well-documented phenomenon is inconsistent with the
idea that traumatic memory events can be forgotten. Laboratory
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research suggests that the opposite would be true--these events are
less likely to be forgotten. This does not prove, however, that traumatic events can never be forgotten. There were literally hundreds of
documented cases following World War II of amnesia for traumatic
combat experiences. Typical of these cases is the story of a tailgunner
whose bomber plane crashed in a field near the runway. The plane was
on fire and the tailgunner knew it would blow up when the fire
reached the gas tank. In spite of a broken arm, the tailgunner freed
himself and then tried to free the pilot who was much larger, unconscious, and had broken both legs. Although a crowd gathered around
at a safe distance, no one would help with the rescue for fear of the
plane exploding. The tailgunner, inch by inch, dragged the pilot to
safety before the plane exploded. Following the event, the tailgunner
developed a conversion disorder that was manifest by paralysis of the
unbroken arm. Although he was awarded a medal for bravery, he had
no memory of the event. It was not until later, after the war ended and
during psychotherapy, that he was able to recall the crash and rescue,
including his own experience of terror during that event (Karon and
Widener, 1997).
Can memories get into storage for events that never happened?
Research by Loftus, Spanos, and others provides ample evidence that
memories can be implanted in storage. Hypnosis and other intrusive
methods have been shown to be effective in implanting memories for
events that never occurred. Existing memories can also be altered,
and details that once existed in storage and were retrieved are found
to no longer be available (Loftus, 1997; Loftus and Ketcham, 1994;
Garry, Manning, Loftus, and Sherman, 1996; Rubin, 1996; Schaeter,
1996, Spanos, 1996). Knowing that memories can be implanted and
altered does not mean, however, that all memories retrieved in therapy are false. Memories that real abuse never occurred can also be
implanted, and perpetrators' memories for abuse may also be altered
and inaccurate.
It is unclear from current research at what age memories can be
put into storage and later retrieved. Childhood amnesia before age
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three or four is well documented (Winograd and Killinger, 1983;
Rubin, 1982; Sheingold and Tenney, 1982). It is believed that most
events do not get put into storage because of immaturity of the brain.
Some more recent research, however, suggests that children as young
as two can remember events for long periods of time and that babies
as young as eleven months have accurate recall for specific events for
over a month (Bauer, 1996). Whether these memories last and are
retrievable seems to be dependent on whether the events continue to
occur and are verbally recoded later. Memories are more likely
to be retained if they are verbally discussed and socially supported.
It is important to understand that storage of memories is not allor-nothing. Fragments and partial memories may be all that were
stored. A complete and literal recording of events may not be available. Looking for external validation and interpretation may be the
safest way of understanding sketchy and fragmentary memories rather
than attempting to fill in the gaps with assumed meaning. A case
study that illustrates the usefulness of external information is of a
young woman who began experiencing flashback memories of a red
liquid blotch coupled with feelings of intense anxiety. She believed she
had been around 18 months old at the time of the event. This was all
that she remembered. Her mother was able to provide information
that the red blotch was probably related to a miscarriage the mother
experienced at that time (Sugar, 1992).
Does trauma in some way change the brain? PET Scans of individuals with a verified history of trauma show differences in limbic
system structures and the amygdala from a matched control group
with no history of trauma (van del' Kolk, 1992). Trauma also alters
neurohormones that impact memory (Cahill, Prins, Weber, and
McGaugh, 1994; McGaugh, 1992; Yehuda, 1994; Yehuda et al.,
1995). PTSD war veterans have also been shown to have memory
deficits when memory ability is measured by standardized tests such as
the Wechsler Memory Scale (Bremner et al., 1993). The implication
of this kind of research is not clear but does provide evidence that
traumatic memories can be lost or fragmentary because of changes in
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the brain. These studies do not shed any light, however, on whether
or how lost memories can later be retrieved.

Retrieval
Once information is put into long-term storage it must be retrievable to be useable. Mnemonic devices that are used to improve memory (associating one concept with another thought or image) help by
facilitating retrieval through association. This model of memory
retrieval has been used by cognitive scientists to explain how memory
for traumatic events is released only by exposure to "rare associates"
(Yates and Nasby, 1993; Dalenberg et aI., 1995). Under this theory,
traumatic memories are stored under a different "file" and accessed
only by very specific cues. This could explain the sudden onset and
flooding by intrusive recollection of previously unavailable traumatic
material. This explanation of flashbacks and flooding of intrusive
memories is also consistent with State Dependent Learning Theory
(Parkin, 1987). Memory that is stored in a specific mental!emotional
state can only be retrieved in that same state. Ethical Standards prevent studying how memory for traumatic events may be state dependent directly through laboratory experiments.
Does this mean that if you use the right cue, you can always
retrieve or unlock the memory? No, because it may never have entered
storage or it may have been inaccurately encoded. Not all abuse is
traumatic to children at the time. Such memories would not be stored
under the system of high emotional arousal and resulting dissociation.
Is some cases intense emotions and meaning of the event were only
paired with abuse later in life.
If trauma and high emotional arousal can interfere with storage
and retrieval, this supports the argument that not all events can be
retrieved accurately (Abhold, 1992; Neisser and Harsch, 1992). For
example, many holocaust survivors can access no memory for verifiable events. In one case, a man was beaten so severely that he was not
able to walk for several days. Forty years later, he only remembers
receiving an occasional kick (Wagenaar and Groenweg, 1990).
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Although this provides evidence that verifiable traumatic events
can be forgotten and not be available for recall, it does not prove that
once-forgotten memories can never be retrieved. Although only one
case of verifiable recovered memory is enough to make it within the
possibility of human experience, many such cases exist.
One such case involved a woman who was adopted at a young age.
She had no memory of her birth parents. While in therapy, she dissociated into another personality and began to talk about a bizarre ritual she experienced with her birth mother. When she switched out of
the dissociated state, she was amnesic for the event. However, within
minutes, she had a flashback of receiving bizarre enematization from
her birth mother. In later therapy sessions, under hypnosis, she
recalled further memories of bizarre abusive rituals. The client was
sure that the memories were inaccurate. She was able to locate her
birth parents and discovered that her birth mother had been institutionalized as a paranoid schizophrenic. She also found albums and
diaries that had belonged to her birth mother. In the diaries were
descriptions and comments about the very rituals and behaviors the
woman had remembered in therapy (Kluft, ] 997).
In summary, what do we know about memory from research?
Although much is still uncertain, it is safe to assume that (1) not
everything gets into memory, (2) what does varies in strength, (3)
memories may be changed, and (4) the retrieval system is not perfect.
It is premature to close the debate on delayed memory recall.
Verifiable case histories gleaned from clinical practice point to the reality of accurate recall of once-forgotten memories. Making the issue an
artificial dichotomy is inaccurate. It is not either!or, it is both. It is
important in working with memory in therapy to avoid the illusion of
a final, definitive truth, make absolute assumptions or prescribe universal interventions. It is important to understand that there is much
yet to be revealed concerning the brain, memory, and trauma.
The more we learn about delayed memory recall, the more
ambiguous the truth becomes and the more careful and informed we
need to be. To protect all who are affected by these concerns, there is
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a greater need for therapy practice
both research and practice.

to

be informed by an integration of
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